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Causes of Appreciation and Volatility of the Dollar
ABSTRACT
In 1981 real interest rates in the United States increased spectacularly,
and the dollar appreciated in real terms by about 20 percent. Since the end of
1981, long-term real interest rates have remained in the range of 5-10 percent,
with nominal long rates above short rates. The dollar appreciated further, but
more gradually, until early 1985. This paper argues that these movemnets in
real interest rates and the real exchange rate are due to the shift in the high—
employment deficit by some $200 billion that was announced in the 1981 budget
program. This requires an increase in real interest rates and a real ap-
preciation to generate the sum of excess domestic saving and foreign borrowing to
finance it. The argument is a straightforward extension of the idea of
"crowding out" at full employment to an open economy.
The current situation -is not sustainable, however. Eventually inter-
national investors will begin to resist further absorption of dollars into their
portfolios, so U.S. interest rates will have to rise further, as the markets
seem to expect, and the dollar will have to depreciate. This will continue
until the current account is back in approximate balance, and the entire load of
deficit financing is shifted to excess U.S. saving.
In his comments on Branson's paper, Jacob A. Frenkel discusses additional
factors that have contributed to the evolution of the dollar since 1980. He
concludes that in addition to U.S. fiscal policies, monetary policy in the
United States and the fiscal position of the U.K., West Germany and Japan have
also contributed to the dollar's strength.
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Princeton University University of Chicago




CAUSES OF APPRECIATION ANDVOLATILITYOF THE DOLLAR
I Introduction and Summary
In 1981 real interest rates in the United States increased
spectacularly, and the dollar appreciated in real terms by about
20 percent. Since the end of 1981, long-term real interest rates
have remained in the range of 5—10 percent, with nominal long
rates above short rates. This suggests that the financial markets
expect rates to rise. The dollar appreciated further, but more
gradually, until early 1985, and has come down by 6-7 percent
since then. This paper argues that these movements in real
interest rates and the real exchange rate are due to the budget
program that was announced in March 1981, and has been subse-
quently executed. In particular, the shift in the high-employ-
ment ——or"structural", as the responsible parties have taken to
calling it —-deficitby some $200 billion requires an increase
in real interest rates and a real appreciation to generate the
sum of excess domestic saving and foreign borrowing to finance it.
The argument is a straightforward extension of the idea of
"crowding out" at full employment to an open economy.
The current situation is not sustainable, however. It is
a "temporary equilibrium," to use the jargon of macroeconomic
dynamics. Eventually international investors will begin to re-
sist further absorption of dollars into their portfolios, so
U.S. interest rates will have to rise further, as the markets seem
to expect, and the dollar will have to depreciate. This will con-—2—
tinue until the current account is back in approximate balance,
and the entire load of deficit financing is shifted to excess
U.S. saving. The following sections of this paper describe the
mechanisms that will generate this outcome, if it occurs.
Sections II and III of the paper present the "fundamentals"
framework of the analysis. This is fundamental in the sense that
it emphasizes the variables, such as the high-employment deficit,
that the market should look to when it is forming expectations
about-movements in interest rates or the exchanqe rate. The focus is
on real interest rates and the real (effective) exchange rate;
these are the variables whose movements have been surprising.
The argument that the shift in the budget can explain the rise
in real interest rates and the dollar is presented in these two
sections.
The role of expectations and the timing of the jump in inter-
est rates and the dollar is discussed in section IV. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provided a credible announcement of a
future shift in the budget. The financial markets reacted by
raising interest rates and the dollar well in advance of the actual
fiscal shift, contributing to the recession of 1981—82.
The volatility of the dollar is briefly discussed in section V.
Modern models of the foreign exchange market emphasize the idea that
the exchange rate is proximately determined in financial markets,
and should be expected to fluctuate like a stock price. Exchange-
rate fluctuations may be of more concern to policy-makers than
stock—price fluctuations, because the exchange rate influences—3—
directly the price of tradeable goods.
Finally, in section VI, three alternative explanations of
recent movements in the dollar are analyzed. The arguments that
these could be due to tax changes that have increased investment
incentives or to financial deregulation are plausible, but would
require evidence of an investment boom to be quantitatively im-
portant. The argument that the strong dollar is due to a shift
in international portfolio demands ——the"safe haven" effect ——
runsup against the old problem of identification. If this were
driving the dollar, U.S. interest rates should have gone down,
not up.
I have attempted to make the exposition here as non-technical
as possible, to maximize accessibility. The paper draws heavily
on Branson (1977, 1983, 1985) and Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1985).
The technical details are given in those references; here I attempt
to lay out the logic and the implications for policy.—4—
II Short-Run Equilibrium in a Fundamental Framework
A good start for our discussion of the causes of the strength
and volatility of the dollar since 1980 is exoositjon of a "text-
book—ish" framework that describes the determination of movements
in real interest rates and the real exchange rate. The focus is
on real rates because these have been the source of surprise and
concern. If nominal interest rates had simply followed the path of
expected or realized inflation and the exchange rate had followed
the path of relative prices, the world would be perceived to be in
order. It is the movement of interest rates and the exchange rate
relative to the price path that is of interest here. So we begin
by taking the actual and expected path of prices as given, perhaps
determined by monetary policy and focus on real interest rates and
the real exchange rate. In this section we develop a framework
that integrates goods markets and asset markets to describe simul-
taneous determination of the interest rate and the exchange rate.
It is "short run" in the sense that we take existing stock of
assets as given. Movement in these stocks will provide the dynamics
of section III. It is a "fundamentals" framework because it focuses
on the underlying macroeconomic determinants of movements in rates,
about which the "market" will form expectations. The latter are
discussed in section IV. The framework is useful because it per-
mits us to distinguish between external events such as shifts in
the budget position (the "deficit"), shifts in international asset
demands (the "safe haven effect"), and changes in tax law or f in—
ancial regulation by analyzing their differing implications for
movements in the interest rate and the exchange rate. We begin—5—
with the national income, or flow-of-funds,identity that constrains
flows in the economy, then turn to asset—market equilibrium that
constrains rates of return, and finally bring the two together in
Figure 1.
A. Flow Equilibrium: The National Income Identity
The national income identity that constrains flows in the economy
is generally written as
I =L1- J. 1-P A=L1P 'j'
withthe usual meanings of the symbols, as summarized in Table 1.
Note that X here stands for net exports of goods and services, the
current account balance. All flows are in real terms. We can
subtract consumer expenditure C from both sides of the right-hand
equality and do some re—arranging to obtain a useful version of
the flow-of-funds identity:
(1) G—T =(S—I)—X.
In terms of national income and product flows, equation (1) says
the total (federal, state, and local)goverriinent deficit must equal
the sum of the excess of domestic private saving over investment
less net exports.
Let us now think of equation (1) as holding at a standardized
"full—employment" level of output, in order to exclude cycli-
cal effects from the discussion. This allows us to focus on shifts
in the budget at a given level of income. If we take a shift in
the full-employment deficit (G-T) as external, or exogenous to the
economy, equation (1) emphasizes that this shift requires some
endogenous adjustment to excess private saving (S—I) and the current—6—
account X to balance the flows in income and product. In parti-
cular, if (G-T) is increased by $200 billion, roughly the actual
increase in the "structural" deficit, a combination of an increase
in S-I and a decrease in X that also totals $200 billion is re-
quired.
Standard macroeconomic theory tells us that for a given
level of income, (S—I) depends positively on the real interest
rate r, and X depends positively on the real exchange rate e
(dollars per unit of foreign exchange, adjusted for relative price
levels) So the endogenous adjustments that would increase S—I
and reduce X are an increase in r and a reduction in e. Some
combination of these changes would restore balance in equation
(1), given an increase in G-T.
We can relate this national income view of the short-run
adjustment mechanism to the more popular story involving foreign
borrowing and capital flows by noting that net exports X is also
net foreign investment from the balance of payments identity:
X-privateNFl =publicNFl, or
(2)X =nationalNFl.
Since national net foreign investxrent is minus national net foreign borrowing (NFB),
so that X =NFl=-NFB,tbe flow-of funds equation (1)can also be writtenas
(3) (G—T) =(S—I)—NFl=(S—I)+NFB.
Thisform of theidentity emphasizes that an increase in the
deficitmust be financed either by an increase in excess domestic—7—
savingor an increase in net foreign borrowing (decrease in net
foreign investment). One way to interpret the adjustment mechanism
is that the shift in the deficit raises U.S. interest rates, in-
creasing S—I. The high rates attract foreign capital or lead to
a reduction in U.S. lending abroad, appreciating the dollar, i.e.,
reducing e. This process continues, r increasing and e falling,
until the increase in S-I and the decrease in X add up to the
originating shift in the deficit.
The actual movements in the government deficit, net domestic
saving (S-I), and net foreign borraiing,and the associated rrovenents in the real
long-tennrater and the realexchange ratee (indexed to 1980) =100)are sha'n
inTable2. ¶L total deficit was roughly zero at the beginning of1981. It ex-
panded to a peak of $175 billion in the bottomofthe recessionin the fourth
quarter of1982, aridthen shrank in the recovery. But the shift in the federal
buget position leaves the total gverniTent deficit at $140 billion in early
1985, after t years of recovery. The recent World tve1opunt Iport (1985)
estinates that the inflation-adjusted shift in the total def-icit fran 1979to
1984is $160 billion. Initially the deficitwas financed nainly by netdc*iestic
saving, which also peaked at the bottom oftherecession. But since 1982the
fractionfinanced by net foreign borrazing has risenby early1985 three-
quarters of the vernirent deficit was financed by foreicai borrcwing.
The noveirents inthe realinterest rate and the real exchange rate
roughly reflect this pattern of financinq. The real interest rate j.mped
fran around 2.0 percent to over 5percentin 1981, fellduringthe reces-
sion, and rose in the recover, stayina in the 5-10percentrange sincemid1983.
•i real exchange rate shs an initial fall of 20oercentin—8-
1981, and a more gradual decrease beginning in early 1983. The
standard lags in adjustment of net exports to changes in the ex-
change rate can explain the slow reaction of net exports (net
foreign borrowing) to the dollar appreciation.
The data in Table 2 are roughly consistent with the story of
maintenance of the flow-of-funds equilibrium in equation (1), with
one big exception and one major loose end. The exception is that
interest rates and exchange rates jumped in 1981, while the struc-
tural deficit only began actually to emerge in 1982. Below in
section IV we argue that this reflects the market's anticipation of
the shift in the budget. The loose end is that we have not said
anything about what determines t1 precise mix or cx,n'bination of rise in r
and e that achieves short—run e.uilibrium. For this we turn to
the financial markets.
B. Financial Market Equilibrium and Rate of Return
We can obtain a relationship between r and e that is im-
posed by financial market equilibrium by considering the returns
that a representative U.S. asset—holder obtains on domestic and
foreign assets of the same maturity. The return on the domestic
asset is i in nominal terms, and r =i—Pin real terms, where
P is the (exogenous, from our point of view) expected rate of
inflation. The return on the foreign asset is i* +ein nominal
terms, where e is the expected rate of change in the exchange
rate. In real terms the U.S. asset—holder's return would be
i +— . Inequilibrium, the difference between the two returns
must be equal to the market-determined risk premium p(B). Here
we assume that dollar-denominated bonds are imperfect substitutes—9—
for foreign-exchange-denominated bonds, so that the risk premium
on dollar bonds increases with their supply: p(B) >0.The
equilibrium condition for rates of return in real terms is then
(4) r —(i*+e_)=p(B).
Next we need to relate the expected rate of change of the
exchange rate to the actual current rate. If we denote the per-
ceived long—run equilibrium real rate that sets the full-employ-
ment current account balance at zero as e, one reasonable assumption
is that the current rate is expected to return gradually toward
long-run equilibrium. Following Dornbusch (1976), we can write
this as a proportional adjustment mechanism:
(5) =O(e—e).
If e is below the long—run equilibrium, it is expected to rise,
and vice versa. If we put expression (5) into the equilibrium
condition (4), and re-arrange a bit, we obtain the financial-
market relationship between e and r:
(6) e =— -— [r_i*_P) —p(B)].
This condition says that for given values of the bond stock B,
inflation ,theforeign nãminal interest rate i, and the long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate ,anincrease in r requires
a decrease in e to maintain equilibrium in financial markets.
Why? If the home interest rate rises, equilibrium can be main-
tained for a given foreign rate only if the exchange rate is ex-
pected to rise. From (5), this means that the actual current rate
must fall to establish e >0.In terms of market operations, the
rise in domestic rates r causes sales of foreign assets and a—10—
fall in e until equilibrium is re-established.
Below we argue that this is essentially what happened in 1981
with the announcement of a path of future deficits. This did not
substantially change the long—run e that would balance the current
account, but it did move r and e.
C. Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate
We can now join the flow equilibrium condition (1) and the
rate—of—return condition (6) to form the short-run framework for
simultaneous determination of r and e. Let us re-write equation
(1) to show the dependence of S and I on r, and of X on e:
(7) G-T =S(r)—1(r)—X(e).
For a given level of the full-employment budget, the trade-off
between r and e that maintains flow equilibrium is given by
the positively-sloped IX curve in Figure i.2 For a given G-T, an
increase in r, which reduces (S—I), requires an increase in e,
which increases X, to maintain flow equilibrium. An increase in
G—T will shift the IX curve up or to the left, requiring some com-
bination of a rise in r and fall in e to maintain flow equili-
briurn.
The rate-of-return condition (6) gives us the negatively-sloped
FM curve in Figure 1, for given B,i*, P, and .Itsslope is -0,
the speed—of-adjustment parameter for expectations. An increase
in the risk premium p, due to a rise in the supply of U.S. bonds B,
will shift the FM curve up and to the right, requiring an increase
in r for any given value of e.
In the short run, equilibrium r and e are reached at the
intersection of IX and FM in Figure ithere both equilibrium con-—11—
ditionsare met. For the purposes of the analysis here, we assume
that initially e =e,with no expected movement in exchange rates.
This is taken to represent the equilibrium around 1980, before the
surge in interest rates and the exchange rate that we are trying
to explain.
D. Effects of a Shift in the Budget
A shift in the full-employment, or structural, budget towards
deficit shifts the IX curve up, as shown in Figure 2. The real
interest rate rises, and the real exchange rate falls, as des-
cribed earlier. The compositon of these movements is determined
by the slope of the FM curve, representing financial market equili-
brium. The movement of r and e from E to E1 raises excess
domestic saving (S—I) and reduces net exports X by a sum equal
to the shift in G-T. This also produces the short-run equilibrium
financing of the shift in the deficit by domestic saving and foreign
borrowing. The results of the shift in G-T are the movements in
excess domestic saving and foreign borrowing, and in r and e,
that are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Thus the framework of Figure 2
roughly captures the movements or r and e from 1981 to 1985.—12—
III Dynamic Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium
In Figure 2, point E0 is taken to represent the initial
equilibrium of 1980 or 1981, before the shift in the structural
deficit, and point E1 may represent the economy in 1984 or 1985,
after the full shift in the budget was completed. The next question
that arises is: is the equilibrium E1 sustainable? The short
answer is no. This takes us to the dynamics of debt accumulation.
At point E, in Fiure 2, the economy is runnina a substantial
.1.
- -
current—accountdeficit, perhaps $150 billion in 1985. This is
adding, on balance, that amount each year to the holdings of dollar-
denominated assets in international portfolios. Either the U.S.
is borrowing abroad to finance partially the budget deficit,
or it is reducing its lending as U.S. asset—holders shift into
government debt. In either case, the net foreign position in
dollar-denominated assets is growing. This will lead eventually
to international resistance to the absorption of further increases
in dollar-denominated assets, and to a rise in U.S. interest
rates and the exchange rate.
At any given set of interest rates and exchange rates such
as point E1 in Figure 2, international investors will have some
desired demand distribution of their portfolios across currencies.
This will depend, of course, on a whole array of expectations
as well as current market prices. As the U.S. current account
deficit adds dollars to these portfolios from the supply side,
this disturbs the initial portfolio balance, shifting the distri-
bution towards dollar assets. In order to induce investors—13—
to hold the additional dollar assets, either U.S. interest rates
have to rise or the exchange rate must be expected to rise,
offering investors a higher rate of return on dollars. This
is the dynamic adjustment of the exchange rate discussed in
terms of sustainability by Krugman (1985). As the dollar de-
preciates, the current account deficit will shrink, if the long—
run equilibrium is stable. As the deficit shrinks, the rate
at which international portfolio distributions are changing is
reduced, and so is the rate at which the dollar depreciates.
Eventually, the economy returns to a long—run equilibrium where
the current account is again balanced, and excess domestic saving
finances the budget deficit. The dynamics of this adjustment
mechanism in a fundamentals model were described in detail in
Branson (1977); the version with a rational expectations overlay
is given in Branson (1983). Krugman (1985) explores the question
of whether the U.S. economy is currently on such a stable path
back to long-run equilibrium.
This adjustment mechanism has a straightforward interpretation
in the fundamentals framework of section II. Consider the
positionof the economy at point E1, reproduced in Figure 3.
Remember that was the initial value of the real exchange
rate that produced current-account balance. At point E1, the
current account is in deficit, and dollar-denominated debt in
international portfolios is increasing. This tends to raise
the equilibrium U.S. interest rate r or the exchange rate e.
In Figure 3, this is captured by a continuing upward drift in—14—
the FM curve. In equation (6) for rate-of-return equilibrium,
the bond stock B is growing. This raises the risk premium p,
shifting FM up.3 As 'M shifts up, driven by the current-account
deficit, the interest rate and exchange rate rise along IX.
This movement continues until the current balance is again roughly
zero, at point E2 in Figure 3. There the real interest rate has
risen enough that S -I=G-Tat full employment.
If most of the increase in S -Ihas come from a reduction
in investment, the E2 equilibrium will have a significantly lower
growth path than the original E0 equilibrium. Through the
shift in the budget, the economy will have traded an increase
in consumption (including defense) for a reduction in investment.
The point E2 in Figure 3 has an exchange rate above
suggesting that in the new equilibrium the dollar will have de-
preciated in real terms relative to its initial 1980 position.
Why? In the transition from E1 to E2, the U.S. is running a
substantial current-account deficit. This will reduce the U.S.
international investment position. In fact, it is shifting
this position from net creditor to net debtor. As Krugman (1985)
shows, the E2 equilibrium could produce a U.S. debt position
similar to that of Brazil in the early l980s. The consequence
of this shift in the international credit position of the U.S.
is a reduction in the investment income item in the current account.
In the current situation, the former positive flow of investment
income will become a negative flow of debt service.
At the original E0 equilibrium, with a surplus on investment—15--
income and the service account, the current account balanced
with a trade deficit. The deficit on trade in goods offset the
surplus in services. But at the new E2 equilibrium, the service
account will be in deficit, requiring a trade surplus to produce
current account balance. The real exchange rate atE2 will have
to be higher than at E0 to produce the required shift in the
trade balance from deficit to surplus. It should be clear that
the result does not depend on the investment income account
actually becoming negative. A series of current account deficits
that reduces the investment income surplus would lead to a new
equilibriuj-n with a smaller trade deficit and therefore a higher
value for .Thisconsequence of the dynamic adjustment through
current-account imbalance is discussed in Branson (1977).
The reversal of the movement of the dollar in spring 1985
may be the beginning of the movement for equilibrium E1 toward
E2. 'I1 &llar peaked in early 1985 and. has fallen by 6 to 7
percent in real terms up to July. Interest rates began to rise
in June 1985. In addition, the mix of financing of the current-
account deficit has shifted from U.S. foreign borrowing towardsa
reduction in U.S. bank lending abroad. Thismay signal the rise in
foreign resistance to further lending in dollars. So there is some
evidence that the movement from equilibriumE1 toward E2 has begun.
Whether is can proceed fast enough to converge toE2 without the
U.S. foreign debt growing unstably is another question, to be
discussed by Krugman (1985).—16—
IV Expectations and Timing
Sections II and III presented the "fundamentals" framework
for analyzing the determinants of movements in real interest
rates and the exchange rate, both in a short run with asset stocks
fixed, and in a longer run in which the budget and the current
account gradually change the country's international investment
position. This framework suggests that agents in financial markets
should form expectations about the exogenous variables that move
the IX and FM curves --theflow and stock equilibrium loci —-
inorder to anticipate movements in real interest rates and the
exchange rate. The timing of the jump in these variables in
1981 suggests that this is, indeed, the case.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had one particular
aspect that is unusually useful for macroeconomic analysis. It
provided an example of a clear—cut and credible announcement of
future policy actions at specified dates. A three—stage tax
cut was announced in the Tax Act in March 1981. Simultaneously,
a multi—stage buildup in defense spending was announced. This
implied a program of future high-employment ——now"structural" --
deficits,beginning late in 1982. The fundamentals framework
tells us that this would begin a process which starts with the
IX curve shifting up, to E1 in Figures 2 and 3, causing a rise
in real interest rates and appreciation of the dollar. It then
continues with a current—account deficit, a further rise in
interest rates, and a real depreciation of the dollar toward a
new long-run equilibrium E2, which may or may not be stable.
The initial movement to E1 is more certain than the eventual
convergence to E2. If the tax changes were enacted when they—17—
were announced, British—style, we would expect to see the jump
in real interest rates and the exchange rate come on the heels
of the tax changes.
But in the U.S. case, the 1981 announont irrplied a forecast
ofa griing hiqh-eitploynent deficit beginning in1982. Duringthe
period from March to June of 1981, projections of the likely
structuraldeficit emerged from sources such as Data Resources,
Inc., and Chase Econometrics and circulated through Washington
and the financial community. This meant that the financial
markets could look ahead to the shift in the budget (and the
IX curve) and anticipate its implications for bond prices and
interest rates.
The expected emergence of a persistent structural deficit
provided a prediction that real long-term interest rates would
rise (moving from E0 to E1 in Figure 2), and bond prices fall.
Once that expectation took hold in the market, the usual dynamics
of asset prices tells us that long rates should rfse immediately,
in anticipation of the future shift in the budget. Indeed,
in the early fall of 1981 the long rate moved above the short
rate, and has remained there since, through recession and
recovery.4 This is consistent with the bond market anticipating
the movement not only to E1 as the budget shifts, but also toward
E2 as the effects of debt accumulation are felt.
The markets could also anticipate an appreciation of the
dollar, i.e., the fall in e from E0 to E1 in Figure 2, as the
structural deficit emerged. This expectation could have been—18—
derived from national income reasoning or from thinking about
capital movements. One could ask the series of questions:
1) What will have to be crowded out to make room for the deficit?;
Answer: investment and net exports. 2) How will, net exports
get crowded out?; Answer: dollar appreciation. Or one could
reason that the rise in interest rates would attract financing
from abroad, leading to appreciation of the dollar. Section II
showed that these are two views of the same adjtzstment mechanism.
Either says that the dollar would appreciate. Once that expecta-
tion takes hold, the dollar should be expected to jump immediately.
Indeed, the steepest appreciation of the dollar came across
1981, well before the emergence of the structural deficit. The deficit
data are summarized in table 3, taken from the 1984 Council of
Economic Advisers Annual Report. Real interest rates and the dollar
show their major movements across 1981; the structural deficit
begins to appear in 1982. This is consistent with the view that
the markets anticipated the shift in the budget position when
they understood the implications of the program that was announced
in 1981. The anticipation of the shift in the budget by real
interest rates and the real exchange rate in 1981 provide an
important example of the effect of credible announcements and
expectations in financial markets.
The implied reversal of the path of the real exchange
rate as the fundamentals model moves from E to E to E also
o 1 2
has its influence through expectations. If, as the exchange
rate falls (the dollar appreciates) from E toward in Figure 2,
agents in the market believe that the movement will eventually—19--
be reversed towards E2, this anticipated depreciation of the dollar
will temper their increase in demand for dollar assets as real
interest rates in the U.S. rise. This would tend to reduce the
magnitude of the appreciation from to E1, and the subsequent
depreciation to E2. This dampening of price fluctuations is
a general property of rational expectations analysis (it used
to be called "stabilizing speculation"). An example is given
in Branson (1983).
The downward jump in the exchange rate from E0 to E1,
and gradual movement back toward are also consistent with
market agents' anticipating the shift in the U.S. international
position from creditor to debtor. This is implied by a suff i-
ciently long period of current—account deficits to finance the
budget deficit. This, in turn requires an initial appreciation
of the dollar. But, eventually, the dollar must fall again,
to a point somewhat below Ce above) its original position. In
anticipation of this swing, the market would generate an initial
jump smaller than the one from to E1, smoothing the path
somewhat.5
Thus, expectations of the implications of first, the
shift in the budget position, and second, the implied switch
of the U.S. from international creditor to debtor, would
generate the movements in real interest rates and the exchange
rate that we have seen since 1980. In particular, anticipation
of the budget shift based on the March 1981 program can account
for the movements on rates that came before the actual emergence—20—
of the structural deficit. Finally, it should be noted that
anticipations of reversals as the path of asset market prices
(generally known as "overshooting") reduce the magnitude of
their fluctuations. It is shifts in the fundamentals that
cause the fluctuations; in general, expectations can be expected
to stabilize.—21—
VVolatility
The expected volatility of exchange rate movements, resembling
stock prices, is by now commonplace. In a comment on Marina
Whitman in 1975, I characterized exchange rates as being approx-
imately determined by asset market equilibrium. In 1976,
Jacob Frenkel and MichaelMussa described the exchan rate asthe re1ati
price of national nonies. In an ixrortant paper in 1981,Frerikel
surveyedandextended results that showed that exchange rates
fluctuate like stock prices rather than godds prices. The
fundamentals model of section II shows exchange rates and interest
rates being determined by the same set of equilibrium, forces.
When we add the expectations layer to the fundamentals model,
the expected volatility of exchange rates becomes more obvious.
Forward—looking financial markets bring the future consequences
of realdisturbances into the present. As discussed in Branson
(1983), news about the trade balance can be interpreted as a
predictor of the future accumulation of the foreign asset position,
a future shift in B in equation (6). This will lead the market
to anticipate a movement in the real exchange rate, and the
rate will jump immediately. As noted in section IV, expecta-
tions will also bring the consequences of future policy actions
into the present. The anticipation of a future shift in the
budget position resulted in a jump in the real exchange rate
in 1981.
Volatility of exchange rates, following time series processes
like stock prices, is thus a normal feature of modern thinking—22—
about exchange-rate determination. Considerations of current
account balance and purchasing-power-parity, which were in
the center of models of exchange—rate determination in the
1960s, now are part of the longer—run equilibration process.
Analysis of exchange-rate fluctuations and their consequences
is essentially the same as the analysis of stock price fluctua-
tions and investment flows.
While volatility is a normal feature of'the exchange market,
its consequences may be more important than stock price volatility,
and therefore policy reactions may differ. In an open economy,
fluctuations in the exchange rate must emerge as fluctuations
either in the prices of tradeable goods or in the profits of
the firms producing them. Volatility in either may be of con-
cern for policy. If fluctuations in exchange rates cause price
fluctuations (as opposed to persistent inflation), this may
discomfort consumers. If exchange—rate fluctuations are absorbed
in profits, the resulting variability increases risk in investment
in the tradeable goods industry. This may reduce such investment,
and raise legitimate policy concerns. Thus the statement that
volatility is a normal and expected feature in the exchange
market does not imply that it is a good thing, or even acceptable.
Policy regarding this volatility is rightly an urgent matter.
for discussion.—23—
VI Alternative Explanations
This paper has argued that the major cause of the historic
increase in real interest rates and the real value of the
dollar in the first half of the l980s was the shift in the federal
budget position that was announced in early 1981. The movements
shown in Figures 2 and 3, and the anticipation by interest rates
and the exchange rate of the shift in the budget position are
consistent with this view There are at least three other
explanations for the strength of the dollar that we will consider
here, if too briefly. The first is the effect of tax changes
in 1981 on investment incentives in the U.S. The second is the
"safe haven" argument that we have seen in a shift in inter-
national portfolio demands toward the dollar. The third is
the effect of financial deregulation pulling foreign funds into
the U.S. We will consider each in turn.
A. Tax Effects
A reduction in profits or investment taxation could yield
results similar to those in Figure 2. The increase in the after-
tax yield would increase investment demand, shifting the IX
curve up; the rest would follow, with the U.S. borrowing abroad
to finance investment at home. There are three points to make
concerning this argument as an "alternative."
First, it is unclear how much changes in the tax laws have
actually changed after—tax yields or the cost of capital. In
a fairly detailed analysis, Bosworth (1985) argues that the
1982 tax bill reversed most of the incentive effects of the—24—
Tax Act of 1981. He ascribes most of the change in the cost
of capital to a reduction in the price of capital goods relative
to output. Given the increasing share of imports in expenditure
on capital goods in the U.S. since 1981, some of this relative
price effect probably comes from dollar appreciation. Thus
the shift in the budget may have indirectly stimulated invest-
rnent by reducing the price of capital goods imports via dollar
appreciation. The argument stands on its head.
Second, it is not clear that investment is booming in the
U.S., as we would expect if the IX shift came from tax changes
stimulating investment. The 1980-82 recessions generated a
severe slump in investment, and the 1983—85 recovery brought
it back. But the level of investment relative to GNP is not
unusually high, as we would expect from this argument.
Finally, if we think an investment boom would lead to a
rise in real interest rates and real dollar appreciation, via
a shift in the IX curve in Figure 2, we should also believe
that a major shift in the structural budget deficit would do
the same. In one case the stimulant is investment spending;
in the other, it is consumer spending and defense. Both
would raise real interest rates and pull in foreign capital.
It is clear that the budget deficit has shifted. So the logic
of the investment argument should lead one to accept the budget
argument.
B. Safe Haven Effects
The second alternative explanation is a shift in inter-
national portfolio preferences toward the dollar, generally—25—
called a "safe haven" effect. This can be easily analyzedusing
Figure 1. A shift in preferences toward the dollar would
effectively reduce the risk premium p in equation (6) forany
given level of B. This would shift the FM curve in Figure 1
down by the same amount. The result would be a reduction in
e, but a fall in real interest rates.
The safe haven argument is based on •a shift in the supply
of funds to the U.S.; the shift in the budget deficit moves
the demand for funds. Both would result in dollar appreciation
in the short run, but the budget deficit delivers the rise
in real interest rates. So while there may well have been some
supply shift, the dominant effect must have come from the demand
side.
C. Financial Deregulation
The final alternative, more promising than the safe haven
argument, is financial deregulation. This would raise deposit
rates, drawing funds from abroad. If it signaled an increase
in financial competition in the U.S., it might draw foreign
funds into non-bank lending. This would contribute to downward
pressure on bank lending rates, contributing to a narrowing of
the spread. It is obvious from Figure 4 that this narrowing
has indeed occurred. The inflow would also result in dollar
appreciation.
This alternative is susceptible to the second two counter-
arguments presented to the tax effect. It should be expected
to yield an investment boom as lending rates fall, and its
logic says that a major shift in the budget deficit should have—26--
the effects shown in Figure 2. So to this writer the conclusion
is clear: the shift in the budget did it!—27--
Footnotes
1Here, for simplicity, I ignorechanges in the term structure
of interest rates and focus on "the" real rate. See Branson,
Fraga, and Johnson (1985) for the analysis of relative movements
of short and long rates consistent with the story being told here.
2
The slope is given by X'/(S'-I ).
3mevertical measure of the shift is just p'(B).
4me technicalanalysis of the movements in long and short
rates with expected fiscal policy, complete with speculative
bubble dynamics, is given in Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1985).
5me technical analysis ofa switch from creditor to debtor
position is provided in Buiter (1984) and in Branson (1985).
The switch moves the market onto a saddle path into the new
debtor equilibrium.—28--
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Table 1: Definitions of Symbols
National Income Flows (all in real terms)
Y =GNP
C =Consumerexpenditure
I =Grossprivate domestic investment
G =Governmentpurchases of goods and services
X =Netexports of goods and services, or the
current account balance
S =Grossprivate domestic saving
T =Taxrevenue
NFl =Netforeign investment by the U.S.
NFB =Netforeign borrowing =— NFl
Prices and Stocks
r =Realdomestic interest rate
i =Nominaldomestic interest rate
i =Nominalforeign interest rate
e =Realeffective exchange rate (dollars per unit
of foreign exchange); an increase in e is a
depreciation of the dollar
ê= Expectedrate of change of e
P =Expectedrate of inflation
p =Riskpremium on dollar-denominated bonds
B =Outstandingstock of government debt—J—
TABLE2: NATIONAL [NCONE FLOWS, INTEREST RATES, AND EXCHANGE PATES.
Data from Citibase and IFS tapes. Real long term interest rates are
the net of the long term (20 year) bond rate and inflation. The
real exchange rate series (IFS) is based on relative normali.red
unit labor costs. A decrease in the real exchange rate represents
an appreciation. The TOTBDEE series include the federal balance s
well as the state and local balances. The CAB is NIPA net forelqri
Investment summed with net capital grants receIved by the U.S..
XDOMSVNG is the difference between Gross Domestic Savinqs and Gross
Domestic Investment in the U.S. .FDEFGNPis the ratIo oi the U.S.
federal deficit to GNP (multiplied by 100).
YEAR CURRENT EXCESS TOTAL REALLT REAL RATIO
ACCOUNT DOMESTIC BUDGET INTERESTEXCHANGE BUDGET DEF.
DEFICIT SAVING DEFICIT RATE RATE TO GNP
(billions)(billions) (billions) (%) ($/composite (%)
1979:1 -3.4 -15.4 -22.2 0.5 1.01 0.4
1979:2 4.3 -17.4 -20.1 - .2 0.99 0.2
1979:3 -2.7 -14.6 -12.9 0.3 1.03 0.7
1979:4 4.6 -15.6 2.l 1.6 1.01 1.1
1980:1 2.9 -7.3 7.5 3.6 1.00 1.5
1980:2 -7.9 43.0 38.1 2.1 0.99 2.5
r,-LOU. I.
a . ) I.I.. I P.L.Vh
—S
1980:4 -3.5 37.1 33.9 3.0 0.99 2.5
1981:1-13.6 9.5 9.7 2.5 0.95 1.6
1981:2 -1.8 5.1 11.4 2.9 0.88 1.7
1981:3 -2.9 19.5 23.3 5.1 0.83 2.C)
1981:4 -9.3 69.0 62.4 4.4 0.87 3.2
1982:1 -2.5 84.6 73.8 5.3 0.83 3.5
1982:2 -11.1 91.8 77.6 6.4 0.80 3.6
1982:3 18.9 112.4 130.4 5.8 0.76 5.3
1982:4 20.9 147.8 179.2 5.2 0.76 6;
1983:1 4.1 14C.1 151.7 6.6 0.78 5.8
1983:2 30.9 88.5 123.4 6.4 0.76 5.1
1983:3 41.5 96.7 133.5 8.1 0.74
1983:4 59.1 73.0 129.3 8.4 0.74 5.2
1984:1 77.7 27.5 107.4
•8.3 0.73 4.5
1984:2 85.0 33.2 109.2 9.6 0.72 4.4
1984:3 119.4 26.6 133.0 9.0 . 4.8
1984:4 81.5 71.6 140.1 7.8 . 5.1—35--
Table 3: CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF THE FEDERAL
BUDGET DEFICIT, FISCAL YEARS 1980—89.
(Billions of Dollars)











































Sources: Budget of the United States Government Fiscal
Year 1985 and Council of Economic Advisers.comment on
CAUSES OF APPRECIATION AND
VOLATILITY OF THE DOLLAR
by
Jacob FrenkelINTRODUCTION
Our experience with flexible exchange rates has beenvery sobering.
We have been reminded again and again that exchange rates, and especially
short—term changes in exchange rates are unpredictable.
I am sure that many of us, academics, policy makers, and market
practitioners alike have shared at one point or another the frustration of
what Governor Henry Wallich termed as "the allusive dollar". When we
thought that the purchasing—power—parity model worked, it collapsed; when we
thought that the simple monetary model worked, it failed; when we thought
that a richer portfolio—balance model worked, it also failed; whenwe turned
to the current—account model, we did not get much help——and so on and so
forth. In fact, as a first approximation, exchange rates seem to followa
random walk. Therefore, by and large, changes in exchange rate (aside for
trends) are unforecastable.
In view of these inherent difficulties market analysts haveadopted
one of the following two alternative strategies. First, they have been
mainly concerned with long—term forecasts. In this vein we have recently
been offered doomsday forecasts on the future course of the dollar. Ac-
cording to such forecasts the dollar is bound to fall at some future time
and, when it falls it will fall very fast. Such crash—landing forecasts may
at best be useful in highlighting possible implications of inconsistent
macroeconomic policies. They are of little use for the short and the medium
runs. Furthermore, since such long—run forecasts are typically open ended,
in many cases they cannot even be refutable. In this sense the usefulness
of such predictions may not be much greater than Keynes' dictum that "in the2
long run we are all dead"——a dictum about which Robert Solow of MIT once
remarked that Keynes was always good in making long—term forecasts.
The alternative strategy adopted by market analysts reflects the
belief that "if you can't forecast well, forecast often". The basis for
such a belief must probably be the notion that "a theory a day keeps your
critics at bay". As a result there has been nothing more confusing than
reading through the ex-post journalistic explanations offered for the day—
to—day changes in the U.S. dollar. For example, over the past few years we
were told that:
"the dollar fell because the money supply grew
faster than expected——thereby generating infla-
tionary expectations"
but, on another occasion we were, told that:
"the dollar rose because the money supply grew
faster than expected——thereby generating expecta-
tions that the Fed is likely to tighten up and
raise interest rates."
On another date we were told that:
"the dollar fell since the budget deficit exceeded
previous forecasts——thereby generating
inflationary expectations on the belief that the
Fed will have to monetize the deficit"
but, on another occasion we were told that:
"the dollar rose since the budget deficit exceeded
previous forecasts——thereby generating expecta-
tions that government borrowing—needs will drive3
up interest rates since the Fed will be unlikely
to give up its firm stance."
On yet another day we were told that:
"the dollar fell since oil prices fell——thereby
hurting Mexico and other debt—ridden oil—producing
countries whose bad fortune may bring about the
collapse of important U.S. banks"
but, on another occasion we were told that:
"the dollar rose since oil prices fell——thereby
helping the debt—ridden oil—consuming countries
whose improved fortune will help the vulnerable
position of important U.S. banks."
How did the "theory a day" approach explain the zig—zag in the value
of the dollar during the past three days? Here the explanation was given in
terms of the estimates of ON? growth rate; accordingly we were told:
"the dollar changed again because the extent of
the revision of the estimated ON? growth rate was
smaller than the expected revision of previous
forecasts of these estimatestt.
One cannot but sympathize with the difficulties shared by newspaper
reporters and financial analysts who feel obliged to come up with daily
explanations for daily fluctuations of exchange rates, and one can only
imagine the deep frustration that yielded the recent headline in the
International Herald Tribune according to which:
"the dollar rose on no news."14
BRANSON'SANALYSIS
Evaluated against this background, Bill Branson's paper on the
"Causes of Appreciation and Volatility of the Dollar," represents a serious
effort to provide a logical story accounting for the evolution of the U.S.
dollar since early 1981 .Hisframework is attractive in that it recognizes
that even though day—to—day changes in exchange rates are intrinsically
unpredictable, economic theory and experience have taught us that broad
trends can frequently be accounted for in terms of conventional economic
fundamentals. Accordingly, in explaining the evolution of the dollar
Branson focuses on one important fundamental—-the budget deficit-—which he
believes did it all——in his words "...the conclusion is clear: the shift in
the budget did it."
In order to establish his thesis Branson constructs a simplified real
model in which the monetary sector is not even invited to make a guest
appearance. According to the basic story, the announcement of The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of early 1981 along with the announcement of a multi—stage
build—up of defense spending, implied large structural budget deficits and
started the process of dollar appreciation. Treating the structural deficit
as the exogenous shock and using the identities of national income accounts,
Branson shows that the budget deficit must crowd out domestic spending by
raising the saving—investment gap; alternatively (or in addition) the defi-
cit can be financed by the rest of the world through the generation of a
deficit in the current account of the balance of payments. Bransoncon-
cludes, sensibly, that the rise in the rate of interest and the real ap—5
preciation of the dollar were necessary in order to bring about the saving—
investment gap and the current account deficit needed to finance the large
U.S. budget deficit.
This brings us up to February 1985. But what about the decline of
the dollar that took place in the subsequent few months (and which I assume
resulted in a change in the title of this conference from the original title
on the "strong U.S. dollar" to the present title on "the U.S. dollar")? In
order to account for that reversal Branson introduces the critical issue of
sustainability. He argues that the rise in U.S. debt-service requirement
and the path along which U.S. debt increases continuously are not sustain-
able. For the cumulative current account deficit will eventually make
foreign investment in the United States risky and will command a risk
premium. As a result it is likely that further capital inflows into the
United States will not be forthcoming. The limited capital inflow will make
the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments unsustainable,
and will necessitate its reduction. The mechanism that will bring about
such a reduction is a drastic depreciation of the dollar. According to
Branson the depreciation which took place after the dollar has reached its
peak in February 1985 may have signaled the start of that process.
Even though this story seems consistent with the general course of'
events, Branson recognizes that there is a bit of a problem in accounting
for the precise timing of the events at both ends of the process. To begin
with the announced Tax Act of 1981 implied that the structural deficit will
occur only by late 1982. Yet, interest rates and the dollar started their
upward trend much earlier. A similar difficulty is also present at the
other end of the process. Specifically, it is not clear what caused the6
start of the reversal in late February 1985 (leaving aside the more impor-
tant question whether the process of depreciation has actually began?) In
order to deal with the difficult question of timing Branson relies on the
powerful (but somewhat arbitrary) argument——expectations. Accordingly, the
early 1981 credible announcement of the future deficit induced asset holders
to anticipate a future appreciation of the dollar and a rise in interest
rates. As a result, like all good asset market theories tell us, these
anticipated future changes were translated into immediate changes in
interest rates and exchange rates even though the policies which have
allegedly induced these changes have not yet been undertaken. Similarly,
Branson argues that the decline of the dollar can also be explained in terms
of expectations. Accordingly, the inevitable future implications of
continuous debt accumulation have already raised current risk premia and,
thereby, have induced the dollar depreciation that started in late February
1981
ADDITIONAL FACTORS
Branson's analysis is consistent with the facts and, as such, it
cannot be rejected on purely logical grounds. He designed his analytical
framework in order to highlight the unique role that U.S. budget deficits
have played in effecting the path of the dollar and of real interest rates.
Within this framework he accomplished his task. My main comment, however,
is that by focusing the discussion on U.S. policies alone and by
constraining the analysis to a "real" model, Branson's explanation does not
allow for two important additional factors-—those which stem from the7
monetary sector and those which stem from development in the rest of the
world.
Monetary Policy
Concerning the first, is seems clear to me that the drastic (and
highly successful) course of the disinflationary monetary policy that was
undertaken by the United States has surely contributed significantly to the
early rise in real interest rates and to the early phase of dollar appre-
ciation. Most likely during those early phases actual monetary policy
rather than expected future fiscal policy was at the center stage. The
evidence that lends credence to this alternative explanation is provided by
the fact that short—term rates of interest rose. Such a rise can be easily
accounted for in terms of tight money. It is much more difficult to account
for it in terms of expectations about future budget deficits. Similarly,
the recent depreciation occurring at the other end of the period under
analysis (since February 1985) can also be explained in terms of
conventional monetary factors. Accordingly, the dollar's drop owes much to
the significant slowdown in the rate of growth of the U.S. economy coupled
with the prevailing growth of the money supply. The combination of the path
of monetary policy and the slow growth of real GNP has meant that, in
relative terms, money was more loose than before and, therefore, the dollar
depreciated. In view of these considerations I would suggest that in
explaining the evolution of the dollar a stronger role be given to the
course of monetary policy.8
The Budget Deficit: A Broader Perspective
Branson's formulation views the "budget deficit" as the basic measure
of the stance of fiscal policy. I believe that this concept, even when
modified to allow for cyclical factors, may not be sufficiently operational
for concrete policy recommendations. Almost any macroeconomic model
suggests that there is a significant difference between the effects of
budget deficits arising from a change in government spending and the effects
of equivalent deficits arising from a change in taxes. (And one does not
need to believe in the extreme version of the "Ricardian equivalence"
proposition in order to make this assertion). Further, most models suggest
that the structure of taxes and government spending maybe critical. For
example, it matters very much whether the tax cut falls on the corporate
sector or on households and whether the tax cuts are transitory or
permanent. Likewise, it matters whether government spending falls on goods
produced by the tradable—goods sector or by the non—tradable goods sector
and whether changes in spending are permanent or transitory. Finally, the
exchange—rate and real interest—rate effects of budget deficits depend
critically on whether the deficits are likely to be financed through
borrowing or through monetary expansion. All of these issues are of prime
importance. The entire profile of the relations among exchange rates,
interest rates and fiscal policies may hinge on them. Therefore, even in a
"real" model that focuses on the role of fiscal policies I would prefer to
see the budget deficit decomposed into its components.
I wish to emphasize that I am in full agreement with Branson's con-
clusion that fiscal policies in the United States have played a major role
in recent years. It is almost self evident that the evolutions of the U.S.9
dollar and real rates of interest during the past few years cannot be fully
explained without attaching a significant weight to U.S. fiscal policies.
At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that the historical record
concerning the relation between budget deficits and real exchange rates is
not unambiguous. As a matter of fact the experiences of other countries as
well as that of the United States during other periods do not suggest a
clear cut, strong and universal relation. In view of this ambiguity it
would be useful if we supplement the date from the most recent U.S.
experience with additional data pertaining to other experiences here and
abroad during other historical episodes.
Knowledge of the broader historical record could be instrumental in
preventing the repetition of past mistakes and could be justified by George
Santayana's famous dictum according to which "those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it". Unfortunately, when applying this dictum
to the study of the relation between two macroeconomic variables like budget
deficits and the real exchange rate one faces significant difficulties since
it is frequently observed that "the past is not what it used to be".
Furthermore, and in contrast with many of the experimental sciences, when
forecasts of the impact of policies on the behavior of individuals are made
on the basis of past experience one may frequently observe that also "the
future is not what it used to be". The inherent difference between social
and physical sciences reflects the impact of experience and memories on
Individual behavior. It renders the study of past records somehwat less
useful since once we go through an experience (as individuals or as a
society) we cannot ignore it and start all over again. Therefore, it can
only be expected that statistical correlations which prevailed at some point10
in time may not remain intact under different circumstances. The present
(and the future) are likely to differ from the past not because "people and
governments have never learned anything from history" as argued by Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel but rather because the present has the benefit of hindsight
whereas the past did not have the benefit of foresight. In view of these
considerations, and in recognition of the fact that the recent episode
represents a narrow segment of U.S. and other countries' experience, I would
be a bit more cautious in drawing far reaching conclusions concerning the
singular role of the budget deficit.
The Role of Foreign Economies
The second factor that could be usefully added to Branson's analysis
of the causes for the evolution of the U.S. dollar concerns fiscal policies
in the rest of the world. In this context it is relevant to note that
during the same period that the United States followed expansionary fiscal
policies, the U.K., West Germany and Japan adopted a relatively
contractionary fiscal stance. The real appreciation of the dollar owes a
great deal to the combination of tight fiscal policy abroad and loose fiscal
policy at home. Further, the pace of economic recovery in Europe has been
much slower than the U.S. pace-—a lack of synchronization that has also
contributed to the real appreciation of the dollar.
In addition to helping to account for the evolution of the dollar,
the incorporation of the foreign economies into the analysis may also serve
another useful role——it may contribute to the reduction of the pressures for
protectionism. It is hard to recall another period in which sentiments for
protection have been so widespread in the United States as they are at the11
present. An excessive emphasis on the U.S. budget deficit as the sole cause
for the dollar strength and the growing frustration with the efforts to
reduce the U.S. fiscal deficit by conventional measures have brought about
new desperate arguments for the adoption of protectionist measures like
import surcharges. The danger with such recommendations is that they might
receive the political support of two otherwise unrelated groups. They are
likely to gain the support of the traditional advocates of protectionism who
claim to defend local industry and workers from foreign unfair competition.
But, more dangerously, they may gain the support of those whose exclusive
concern with the budget deficit leads them to support almost any policy that
raises fiscal revenue. Import surcharges, once in place (even those
surcharges that are adopted as "temporary measures") are hard to remove
since, as George Stigler once remarked "a sustained policy that has real
effects has many good friends". At the present there are very few measures
whose long term costs to the interdependent world economy may be as high as
protectionist measures. Taxes on trade will hurt exports, and will restore
inward looking economic isolationism instead of outward looking economic
coordination. Protectionist measures will transmit the wrong signals to
those developing countries that are still attempting to resist domestically
popular pressures to default on their debt, and, further, they may ignite
trade war. Therefore, in analysing the causes for the evolution of the U.S.
dollar it is useful to recall that out there, there are other economies
whose own fiscal stance has contributed to the dollar's strength and who are
likely to retaliate and open up a trade war if the United States attempts to
"solve" its budgetary difficulties by means of import tariffs.12
The Safe—Haven Argument
Following his analysis of the mechanism by which the value of the
dollar and the real rates of interest have been related to the path of the
budget deficit, Branson mentions several additional explanations that have
been advanced at one point or another. Among these explanations is the
"safe haven" argument according to which the dollar strength can be
explained in terms of portfolio shifts towards the relatively safe dollar—
denominated assets. There are at least two interpretations of the safe—
haven argument. The first emphasizes the politidal stability of the U.S.
relatively to other parts of the world in which the risks of expropriations
and defaults are higher. The difficulty with this interpretation is that,
except for special situations associated with the Iranian revolution and
with some of the Latin—American crises, it is hard to associate the periods
of sharp rises in the value of the dollar with corresponding deteriorations
in political stability abroad. Further, we have not observed a correspond-
ing decline in stock—market indexes in Europe and Japan (a drop that should
have taken place if indeed foreign investors divested themselves from other
assets in order to purchase U.S. assets), nor did we observe a significant
differential between rates of return on dollar denominated assets issued in
New York and other dollar denominated assets issued in the Euro—currency
markets.
The second interpretation of the safe—haven argument emphasizes the
confidence that asset holders have in the overall course of U.S. macro-
economic policies. Thus, it focuses on the economic stability that is
implied by U.S. policies. Accordingly, the successful disinflation and the
economic recovery have made dollar denominated assets attractive. The13
difficulty with this argument is that, as with the previous one, it is hard
to identify those developments in recent U.S. macroeconomic policies that
have contributed to enhance confidence by market participants exactly during
periods corresponding to dollar appreciation. This difficulty is magnified
once we recall that, on the whole, during the period of dollar appreciation
the market interpreted the sustained record budget deficits as bad news
concerning the stabilizing effects of U.S. macroeconomic policies.
In principle, the short phase of dollar depreciation following its
peak level in February 1985 could also be interpreted in terms of the safe—
haven argument. Accordingly the rise in external U.S. liabilities
consequent on the cumulative current—account deficit changed the ratio of
the outstanding supply of U.S. to foreign bonds. This change raised the
risk premium on dollar denominated assets and reduced their attractiveness.
The difficulty with this argument (as well as with Branson's own interpreta-
tion of the depreciation) is that, as an empirical matter, various studies
have found that the quantitative magnitude of the risk premium is extremely
small. Furthermore, as a theoretical matter, by ignoring the role of stocks
and other real assets the specification of the risk premium as depending
exclusively on the relative supplies of bonds of different currency
denominations focuses on a very narrow segment of asset holders portfolios.
On the basis of these considerations I share Branson's skepticism concerning
the force of the safe—haven argument.14
CRASH LANDING?
One of the great attractions of Branson's approach is his attempt to
explain the evolution of the dollar in terms of fundamentals. My own
comments attempted to supplement his choice of fundamental (the U.S. budget
deficit) with two additional ones—U.S. monetary policy and foreign fiscal
policies. The virtues of the "fundamentals—approach to the analysis of the
dollar" are that once we identify the relevant list of fundamentals, we may
proceed in making concrete policy recommendation as well as in making
reasonable forecasts of the prospects for the dollar (based, of course, on
forecasts on the likely course that will be followed by the fundamentals).
These characteristics are not shared by other approaches like the "bubble
approach" that has gained popularity in recent years in spite of the
mounting evidence against it.
If the fundamentals approach is to be taken seriously then forecasts
of the path of the dollar must be conditional on forecasts on the paths of
the fundamentals. Since all the evidence suggest that at least for the
medium run the U.S. budget deficit is there to stay, and since by all
indications the Federal Reserve Board is unlikely to depart to a significant
extent from its anti—inflationary posture, it is difficult to rationalize
forecasts of dollar collapse and crash landing as long as these policies
remain (and are expected to continue to remain) in place. Can expectations
behave erratically and in so doing lead to a collapse of the entire house of
cards? Of course they can. But, as long as expectations are based on the
model whose outcomes they are purport to be forecasting, it is unlikely that
they will behave in a manner that is entirely divorced from the implications15
of' the actual changes in the Fundamentals. Thus, I conclude thata crash
landing is unlikely.
EXCHANGE—RATE VOLATILITY
In addition to dealing with the secular trends of thedollar, Branson
points out that volatility is an intrinsic part of flexible exchange—rate
regimes. As it were, volatility comes with the territory. In this context
Branson notes that the fact that volatility is normal, does not imply that
it is good. Thus he concludes without amplification that"policy regarding
this volatility is rightly an urgent matter".
I definitely agree with Branson's statement that under a flexible
exchangerate regime exchange rates are likely to be volatile expeeially if'
the underlying factors (including, of course, theunderlying policies) are
volatile. I also share Branson's judgment that volatility is an urgent
matter. I am concerned, however, that such pronouncements, unlessthey
specify how and whether we should act on that urgency, may lead (even
unwillingly) towards the adoption of undersirable policies. Theymay result
in the adoption of various intervention rules thatmay reduce the volatility
of' exchange rates at great cost. The key point to realize is that the
volatility of exchange rates is not the likely source of the difficulties
but rather a manifestation of the prevailing package of macroeconomic
policies. Fixing or manipulating the rates without introducing a
significant change into the conduct of policies may not improve matters at
all. It may amount to breaking the thermometer of a patient suffering from
high fever instead of providing him with proper medication. The absence of
the thermometer will only confuse matters and will reduce the information16
essential for policymaking. If volatile events and macropolicies are not
allowed to be reflected in the foreign exchange market, they are likely to
be transferred to, and reflected in, other markets (such as labor markets)
where they cannot be dealt with in as efficient a manner.
The preceding argument ignored, however, one of the important
characteristics of the gold—dollar system which various proposals for
reduced flexibility of exchange rates attempt to promote, i.e., the
characteristic of the "discipline of the exchange." Accordingly, it could
be argued that the obligation to peg the rate or to follow a predetermined
intervention rule would alter fundamentally the conduct of policy by
introducing discipline. Experience seems to suggest, however, that national
governments are unlikely to adjust the conduct of domestic policies so as to
be disciplined by the exchange—rate regime. Rather, it is more reasonable
to assume that the exchange—rate regime is more likely to adjust to whatever
discipline national governments choose to have. It may be noted in passing
that this is indeed one of the more potent arguments against the restoration
of the gold standard. If governments were willing to follow policies
consistent with the maintenance of a gold standard, then the standard itself
would not be necessary; if however, governments are not willing to follow
such policies, then the introduction of the gold standard per se will not
restore stability since, before long, the standard will have to be
abandoned. In short, no exchange—rate system can protect us from bad
policies.17
ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
In view of the disruptive effects exerted by the strong and the
highly volatile dollar, various proposals for reform of the international
monetary system have been put forward. Is this the time for reform? I
believe not! If indeed the root cause for the current difficulties lies in
the fiscal positions of the United States, Europe and Japan, then the solu—
tiori for the problems does not call for a monetary reform, for tariff and
protectionism, for taxes on capital flows (or for other measures which throw
sand in the wheels), nor does it call for intervention rules. Rather, it
calls for a restoration of fiscal order in which the United States adopts
more contractionary fiscal stance while Europe and Japan adopt a more expan-
sionary stance. I believe that the central difficulties with the current
regime do not rest with the exchange rate system or with the exchange—rate
policies; rather, they rest with the overall mix of the uncoordinated
macroeconomic policies. It is unlikely, therefore, that the introduction of
exchange—rate targets or other superficial measures dealing only with the
symptoms of the disease can do any good unless they are accompanied by
drastic changes in the way in which macropolicies are being designed. In
fact, the adoption of policies that deal with anything but the ultimate root
cause may do more harm than good. For, placing excessive weight on the role
of exchange rates may divert attention from the more central role that
global macroeconomic policies play in the interdependent world economy.
In general, in assessing various plans for reform it is pertinant to
recall that a critical feature of any operational monetary system must be
a formal resolution of the sorcalled (n—i) problem. We have n currencies
and only n—i independent exchange rates. We thus have one degree of18
freedom and its disposal must be explicitly specified. It takes two to
tango and it takes one for intervention. The original Bretton Woods system
allocated the degree of freedom to the United States which obliged itself to
peg the price of gold at $35 an ounce; the other n—i countries then com-
mitted themselves to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar. A design of
the international monetary system is not complete unless it provides a re-
solution of this (n—i) problem. Therefore, in evaluating the alternative
proposals my question would be how do these alternative systems deal with
the extra degree of freedom. A reform of the international monetary system
might be viewed as a constitutional change that occurs once in a lifetime, a
"step of last resort" which might be thought of as the available bullet.
Reforming the international monetary system is unlikely to solve our current
problems unless the world fiscal system gets its act together. Last bullets
should be used reluctantly. Once fired, they better not miss.